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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a jury verdict convicting him of the
crime of Theft in the above-entitled matter in a trial held
December 4 - 1 4 , 1990. Defendant also appeals from the judgment
entered on said jury verdict, as well as the denial of his Motion
for New Trial in this case entered by the Honorable Michael R.
Murphy, Third District Judge, on April 27, 1993.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial judge erroneously fail to grant the

Defendant's Motion to Reduce Judge Leonard H. Russon's Order
Granting New Trial to Writing?

The trial court's decision is

reviewed under a legal correctness standard, with no deference
given to the trial court's determination.

State v. Ramirez, 817

P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).
2.

Were certain instructions given to the jury by the trial

judge erroneous?

The issue is reviewed for legal correctness

since failure to properly instruct the jury in a criminal case
can constitute reversible error as a matter of law.

State v.

Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991); State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235
(Utah 1985) .
3.

Did the trial court err by failing to give certain

specific instructions requested by Defendant?
review is the same as in Paragraph 2 above.

1

The standard of

4.

Did the trial court err by allowing the State to impeach

the Defendant through the use of his prior convictions entered on
eighteen counts of Securities Fraud?

Whether a piece of evidence

is admissible is a question of law and an appellate court always
reviews questions of law under a legal correctness standard.
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).
5.

Did the trial court err by allowing State's witness John

Baldwin to testify concerning an investigation of Granada, Inc.
for unregistered securities violations?

The same standard

outlined in Paragraph 4 above applies to this issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal are contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After Defendant was convicted of the crime of Theft in the
above-entitled matter by a jury in a trial held December 4-14,
1990, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, the trial judge in the
matter, subsequently granted a Motion in Arrest of Judgment, set
aside the jury verdict, and granted a Judgment of Acquittal in
the case.

It should be noted that Judge Russon also ruled he

would have granted a new trial had he not granted the Judgment of
Acquittal (R. 1619 p. 110).
Subsequently, Judge Russon was appointed to fill a position
on the Utah Court of Appeals and the Honorable Michael R. Murphy
was appointed to take his place in this matter.
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On October 20, 1992, Defendant made a "Motion to Reduce
Judge Leonard H. Russon's Order Granting New Trial to Writing."
Defendant also filed a "Motion for New Trial on Theft Conviction"
on February 12, 1993.
All of Defendant's post-judgment motions were denied on
April 27, 1993 by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In 1979 a limited partnership called "Three Crowns,

Ltd.", was formed for the purpose of acquiring an existing mobile
home park in Las Vegas, Nevada.

Three individuals, one of which

was Defendant, originally created the partnership and served as
general partners.

These individuals sold limited partnership

interests to several investors (R. 2056 pp. 106-108, 124-27).
The Three Crowns Mobile Home Park was managed by an independent
property manager until 1985 when a Utah corporation, Granada,
Inc., assumed direct property management responsibility.

Defen-

dant was a part owner and president of Granada, Inc. The limited
partners included Defendant, his brother, and later by substitution, Defendant's wife (R. 2056 pp. 106-108, 129-130, 193). The
limited partners also included the four individuals named in the
Amended Information charging Defendant with theft. Granada,
Inc., became the acting general partner in approximately 1980 (R.
2056 pp. 127-130).
2.

From 1979 through October of 1986, this partnership

owned and operated the Three Crowns Mobile Home Park.

Some net

profits were earned by the park from 1980 through 1986 (R. 2056
3

pp. 131-132; R. 2058 pp. 65-67).

From time to time, these funds

were loaned by Granada, Inc., the managing general partner of the
partnership, at interest through a Granada account pending
repayment and distribution to the limited partners (R. 2056 pp.
132-137, 182). The purpose of these periodic loans was to
provide additional income to the partnership and to increase the
investment returned to the partners (R. 2056 p. 133; R. 2058 pp.
114-117).

These funds were normally loaned through the Granada

Interoffice account (GIOA) or to other related borrowers because
such accounts provided a higher interest rate and a better return
to the partners than other commercial lending sources (R. 2056
pp. 133, 168; R. 2058 pp. 114-117).
3.

In late 1985, the executive management committee at

Granada, Inc., approved the sale of the Three Crowns Mobile Home
Park, along with other property either owned by Granada or other
separate partnerships (R. 2056 pp. 139-141; R. 2058 pp. 93-94).
The sale of Granada properties was normally handled by either
Keith Sorenson, a Granada officer and director, or Defendant who
were assisted by other executives. Normally the executive
committee, as a body, did not participate directly in the sale of
properties.

These responsibilities were delegated (R. 2056 pp.

151-152; R. 2058 pp. 123-124).
4.

After reviewing and negotiating several offers over a

period of eight to ten months, the Three Crowns Mobile Home Park
was finally sold in October, 1986 providing net sales proceeds of
$838,000.00 plus Granada's share of the sales commission (R. 2056
4

pp. 149, 167). Defendant and one of the Granada project executives, Kim Heaton, travelled together to Las Vegas and participated in the closing at the Nevada Title Company (R. 2056 pp. 3840, 150-151; R. 2061 pp. 2-6). After the closing and return to
Salt Lake City, the $838,000.00 of net sales proceeds, plus
Granada's commission ($235,000.00) were deposited in the Three
Crowns partnership account.
The majority of these funds (less certain operating
expenses) was then loaned at interest through the Granada Interoffice Account (GIOA) pending the resolution of some serious gas
line leaks in the mobile home park and the resolution of certain
liability claims against the park (R. 2056 pp. 33-36, 44, 168170).

The GIOA account then placed these funds in other inter-

est-bearing accounts or loaned the funds to other borrowers (R.
2056 pp. 178-179).
5.

Defendant testified at trial that it was always his

intent, and the intent of Granada, Inc., and others to assure
repayment of these funds with interest from the partnerships
and/or other Granada sources.

The sales proceeds advanced from

the Three Crowns Partnership through the GIOA were loaned and
documented in the same manner as other Three Crowns monies which
had been previously loaned to other projects and subsequently
repaid (R. 2056 pp. 132-137).
6.

Defendant testified that at the time the sales proceeds

in question were loaned from the Three Crowns Partnership through
the GIOA, he believed Granada, Inc. was financially able to
5

assure the repayments of the loans (R. 2056 pp. 180-181) .
Indeed/ Lamar Hatch, the comptroller of Granadaf and all other
executives of Granada who testified at the trial (Wayne Jensen,
Steve Apple, and Dick Miller) all stated they believed in the
financial stability of Granada until approximately January of
1987, three months after sale of Three Crowns Mobile Home Park
(R. 2056 pp. 115-118; R. 2058 pp. 121-122).
7.

At that time, a re-evaluation of the company's assets

was performed at the direction of Defendant in order to determine
the source and solution of the cash flow problems the company had
been experiencing since mid-1986 (R. 2056 pp. 115-118; R. 2058
pp. 65-67).

Defendant testified that he was shocked to learn in

January, 1987 that Granada might not have sufficient assets to
insure repayment of both the Three Crowns Partnership loans which
had been made in October of 1986 (R. 2056 p. 118) and other
loans.
8.

Defendant and others testified that the option of

Granada repaying the loan was further severely impaired a month
later when the State of Utah forced Granada to file for Chapter
11 Reorganization in Bankruptcy (R. 2056 pp. 123, 196; R. 2061
pp. 17-25).
9.

Notwithstanding these severe problems which were com-

pounded by the State of Utah's actions, Defendant was able to pay
in full two of the Three Crowns Limited partners (not related to
Defendant), and arrange an exchange of a third partners' interest
for another asset (R. 2056 pp. 193-196).
6

10.

Defendant advised Ned Gregerson, a limited partner, of

the sale at the time it occurred, and also advised him that
partnership funds would be distributed to the limited partners
(R. 2056 pp. 164-167; R. 2061 p. 53). All parties, including
Defendant, were probably overly optimistic as to how soon this
distribution could occur (R. 2056 pp. 160-161, 167; R. 2061 pp.
53-55).

However, the proceeds from the sale of the Three Crowns

Mobile Home Park could not be distributed until the managing
general partner was satisfied that all liability claims, or the
potential for serious claims, from the leaking gas lines in the
mobile home park had been resolved (R. 2056 pp. 155-161).

This

took longer than anticipated, and as a result no immediate
distributions were made.
11.

Defendant openly advised Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson

and Neal Mortensen of the sale or pending sale of the Three
Crowns Mobile Home Park and of his intent to either make distribution or reinvestment of their net sales proceeds as soon as it
was prudent and reasonable to take such action (R. 2056 pp. 164167; R. 2057, pp. 36-37; R. 2061 pp. 53-55, 62, 74-78).

Further,

Defendant arranged with Neal Mortensen for the donation of part
of his sales proceeds (R. 2057 pp. 37-40).

It was Defendant's

intent that these donations be completed.
12.

But for the intervention of the State, Defendant be-

lieved all these distributions would have been completed as
intended (R. 2056 pp. 120-122, 180-187, 196). It was not until
January, 1987 that anyone at Granada, including Defendant, had
7

any understanding that the company might be in a negative equity
position of some 3 to 5 million dollars (2056 pp. 114-118; R.
2058 pp. 69-72).

Even then a workout plan was developed by the

executive and workout committees which would have addressed this
negative equity position and Granada's financial challenges (R.
2056 pp. 120-122; R. 2061 pp. 17-22).

All the executives who

knew and understood the business thought the workout plan would
succeed.

The worst scenario occurred when the State forced

Granada into a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy (R. 2056 pp. 123, 196; R.
2061 pp. 22-25).

As a result, the Three Crowns Partnership was

forced to file a separate civil lawsuit against the Granada
trustee in bankruptcy claiming that Three Crowns should receive a
preferential payback (R. 2056 pp. 190-191).
13. Defendant requested that John Chamberlain, a limited
partner who had knowledge of mobile home parks, provide Granada
and Defendant with information and references on any potential
buyers.

During the summer of 1986, Mr. Chamberlain referred two

potential buyers to Defendant, neither of which materialized (R.
2056 pp. 145-149).

Mr. Chamberlain was advised when he contacted

Defendant (after the closing in October, 1986), that the property
had been sold (R. 2056 p. 147). However, his share of the sales
proceeds were not disbursed to him in December, 1986 because of
the potential liability claims from the hazardous gas lines (R.
2056 pp. 155-160).

At Mr. Chamberlain's request, he subsequently

received, through an exchange, an interest in another mobile home
park which Defendant believed had a higher value than the inter8

est held by John Chamberlain in Three Crowns. Thus, through the
exchange, Chamberlain received his full disbursement "in kind"
from the Three Crown Partnership (R. 2056 pp. 193-195).

The

other partners named in the Information have not yet received
their distribution although two other non-related partners have
through the efforts of the Defendant received their distribution
in full.

All family related partners are still awaiting their

distribution.
14.

At the time of the sale it had not been determined

whether the partnership would engage or invest in other ventures
as allowed in Paragraph 2.2 of the Certificate Agreement of
Limited Partnerships.

Defendant testified that it was generally

understood that some of the partners would reinvest part or all
of the their proceeds from the sale of the Three Crowns Mobile
Home Park in other Granada partnerships at such time as proceeds
were distributed (Exhibit 1-P, R. 2056 p. 200).
15.

It was Defendant's intent to provide distribution of

sales proceeds to those partners who were not reinvesting their
funds when the gas line problems with the mobile home park and
liability claims had been resolved, and other closing costs paid;
but such distributions would not take place until those contingencies were resolved (R. 2056 pp. 187-188, 207-208).

A majority

of the partnership interests were owned by the Defendant, his
family, and their direct associates.
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16.

Defendant was convicted of the crime of Theft in the

above-entitled matter by a jury in a trial held December 4
through December 14, 1990.
17.

The Honorable Leonard H. Russon subsequently granted a

Motion in Arrest of Judgment, set aside the jury verdict, and
granted a judgment of acquittal in the case.

Subsequently still,

Judge Russon/s decision was reversed by the Utah Court of Appeals
and the matter remanded for reinstatement of the jury verdict and
sentencing.
18.

On January 25, 1993, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy

entered an Order sentencing the Defendant to the indeterminate
term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for the
second degree felony offense of Theft.

Judge Murphy granted

Defendant a stay of the prison sentence and placed him on probation under the supervision of the Utah Department of Adult
Probation and Parole for a period of thirty-six months. Among
the conditions of probation required by the Court were that the
Defendant serve six months in the Salt Lake County Jail, which he
commenced serving May 10, 1993 after the denial by Judge Murphy
of his Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause.

Defendant was

also ordered to pay restitution in an amount to be determined by
the Adult Probation and Parole Department.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is the position of Defendant that the Honorable Michael
R. Murphy erred by not entering a written order reducing Judge
Leonard H. Russon's oral order for a new trial to writing as
10

requested by Defendant.

Defendant argues that Judge Murphy in

effect overruled the trial judge, a co-equal in this situation,
in not entering an order granting a new trial.
Defendant also argues that the trial judge should not have
given certain instructions to the jury because said instructions
were erroneous and mislead the jury. Among those instructions
were the elements instruction of the case and an instruction
stating that the formation of criminal intent in a theft case
could occur at any time and did not have to occur at the time
Defendant exercised unauthorized control over the property.
Defendant argues that the intention to steal must have existed at
the time of the taking and no subsequent felonious intent suffices to carry the Stated burden of proving theft.
Furthermore, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by
failing to give specific instructions requested by Defendant
regarding the nature of the law as to limited partnerships in the
State of Utah; the time of forming intent in a theft case; and a
good faith instruction, all of which were requested by Defendant.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by allowing
the State to impeach him through the use of his prior convictions
entered on eighteen counts of Securities Fraud.

Defendant argues

that under the circumstances of this case, the Court had discretion to exclude the prior convictions despite the trial judge's
rulings.

Defendant also argues that the court should have

excluded his prior convictions under the circumstances of this
case because those convictions are presently on appeal.

11

The Utah

Supreme Court granted a Writ of Certiorari to review Defendant's
convictions on eighteen counts of Securities Fraud and that
review is presently pending.

Defendant also argues that his

prior convictions for Securities Fraud do not necessarily involve
dishonesty or false statement and therefore should not have been
admitted by the trial court as impeachment of his testimony.
Defendant further argues that the trial judge erred by
allowing the State's witness John Baldwin to testify concerning
an investigation of Granada, Inc. for unregistered securities
violations.

The subject matter of the instant theft charge

against the Defendant involved a limited partnership called Three
Crownsf but the State's witness was allowed to testify about an
investigation of a real estate entity called Granada, Inc. which
investigation had little or no relationship to the Three Crowns
Limited Partnership.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S "MOTION TO REDUCE JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON'S
ORDER GRANTING NEW TRIAL TO WRITING"
Although Defendant was convicted by a jury of the crime of
Theft in a trial held December 4 through December 14f 1990, the
Honorable Leonard H. Russon, the trial judge, set aside the jury
verdict, arrested judgment, and further granted a judgment of
acquittal in the case. The State appealed and caused much delay
in the situation as a result of its appeal. Although the Utah
Court of Appeals reversed Judge Russon's decision and ordered the
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jury verdict reinstated and the Defendant sentenced on the charge
of Theft, another fact needs to be considered carefully by the
Court of Appeals.

The Honorable Leonard H. Russon ruled on the

record that had he not set aside the jury verdict and arrested
judgment and granted a judgment of acquittal in the case, he
would have granted a new trial (R. 1609 p. 110, Add. 1).
As can be readily seen from page 110 of the transcript of
Motions, Judge Russon ruled:
. . . But in addition to that, I do make the
following finding that in addition to that, if
my ruling had been otherwise, I would have
granted a new trial because I don't think the
instruction clearly outlined that intent as is
necessary in the element instructions. I think
you can do something with a purpose, but I am
not sure that that constitutes intent as required by the statute and defined earlier in
the statute of a specific intent to deprive
. . .

(R. 1609, p. 110; Add. 1).
Defendant filed in the lower court a "Motion to Reduce Judge
Leonard H. Russon's Order Granting a New Trial to Writing" (R.
2210-2220; Add. 2). However, Judge Murphy (who was appointed to
the case when Judge Russon was appointed to the Court of Appeals)
subsequently denied the Motion and stated that the aforementioned
statements of Judge Russon were merely "musings on the record"
and did not constitute a ruling, despite what Judge Russon had
held (R. 2844).
This issue becomes extremely relevant when one considers
that the Defendant raised numerous substantive issues in his
Motion for New Trial before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, all
13

of which were not considered by Judge Murphy to be "substantial
enough to result in reversal, an order for new trial, etc.". Yet
this was not the opinion of Judge Russon.
It is Defendant Larsen's position that even though Judge
Russon's ruling granting the motion for new trial was not reduced
to writing, it still constitutes a valid order of the Third
District Court and cannot be ignored.

The comments of Judge

Russon make clear that he was indeed making a "finding" and a
"ruling".

These were not simple musings on the record by Judge

Russon, but clear determinations that he was issuing an order
granting a new trial and urging the State to appeal such order
for new trial simultaneously with their appeal of the issue of
his arrest of judgment and judgment of acquittal.

It is an

undisputed fact that the State chose not to appeal Judge Russon7s
order granting a new trial.
The State also chose not to reduce Judge Russon's order
granting a new trial to writing, presumably because it did not
intend to accept his invitation to appeal the ruling.

Defendant

Larsen and his attorney were instructed to reduce the order
arresting judgment and granting judgment of acquittal to writing,
but Defendant was not instructed to reduce the order granting a
new trial to writing.

It is Defendant Larsen's position that the

trial court should have simply reduced Judge Russon's oral ruling
to writing and entered the order for a new trial, allowing the
State to take its appeal if it chose to do so.
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Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure entitled
"Errors and Defects" states as follows:
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial
rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or
other parts of the record and errors in the
record arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time and after
such notice, if any, as the court may order.
It is Defendant Larsen's position that the Court should
impose the standards of Rule 30 and simply enter a written order,
which was not entered previously due to oversight or omission,
since this Court may correct such oversight or omission at any
time.
In the Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Kelsev, 532 P.2d
1001 (1975), Justice Crockett, writing for a unanimous court
(with two separate concurring opinions) dealt with a case in
which the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins had heard a criminal case in
a bench trial.

Judge Wilkins placed an oral statement into the

record regarding what he intended to do with regard to the
judgment and verdict in the case, " . . . (h)owever, he resigned
before written findings of fact and conclusions of law were made
and placed in the file. . .".

In reviewing Rule 63(a), U.R.C.P.,

the Court held that the term "other disability" involved a judge
who resigned from the bench before he could complete his duties.
The Court held:
Inasmuch as the stated findings and verdict of
Judge Wilkins at the conclusion of the trial
were sufficient to meet the requirements of
Rule 52, U.R.C.P., there could be no question
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about the authority or propriety of the successor judge to make and sign formal findings of
fact and conclusions of law which were consistent with the findings and verdict of the judge
who actually tried the case. (Emphasis supplied) .
532 P.2d at 1006.
It is the position of Defendant that this case stands as
precedent for the situation presently being reviewed by this
Court.

Since Judge Russon clearly made a "finding" and a "rul-

ing" orally from the bench, the mere fact that he resigned and
left the bench before entering a written order did not give Judge
Murphy carte blanche authority to overrule Judge Russon's "ruling" and enter a different ruling.

In fact, Defendant would

argue that it is error under the Kelsey case for Judge Murphy to
have done so.
Judge Murphy should have been bound by the "law of the case"
doctrine pronounced in several Utah cases, both civil and criminal.

As pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of

State of Utah v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125 (1989), "(T)he general
rule is that one judge may not redetermine a previous ruling made
by another judge in the same case. E.g., Sittner v. Bighorn Tar
Sands and Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984); Salt Lake
City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah
Ct.App. 1988) . . . ".

779 P.2d at 1129. Although the Court in

Lamper found that if relevant circumstances had changed in the
intervening period, the second judge may then re-examine the
earlier ruling, the Court cited the example in that case of a
change in the governing law.

In the instant case, there have
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been no relevant circumstances which have changed in the intervening period.

In fact, Judge Murphy was at a significant

disadvantage in attempting to decide a motion for new trial in
this matter, since his Honor did not hear the trial involved in
this case.

This circumstance is extremely significant.

In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court considered the very circumstances of the instant
case.

In Saunders. the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded

convictions for burglary, theft, possession of a firearm by a restricted person, and being an habitual criminal, where a judge
presiding at trial granted a motion for severance of charges
which had been denied during pretrial proceedings by a different
judge.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Hall held:
. . . (W)here the judge presiding at trial is
different from the one who denied the pretrial
motion, as was the case here, to grant the same
motion at trial, absent a change in the facts
relevant to ruling on the motion, would be to
overrule a co-equal. This would be improper.
(Sittner v. Bighorn Tar Sands and Oil, Inc.,
Utah, 692 P.2d 735 (1984)".

699 P.2d at 740.
While the circumstances are a little different in the sense
that the lower court in the instant case was not dealing with a
pretrial motion granted by a co-equal judge, the court was
dealing with a post-trial motion granted by Judge Russon, ordering a new trial for Defendant Larsen as an alternative to the
motion in arrest of judgment.

The Honorable Judge Murphy should

have been expressly prohibited by the "law of the case" doctrine
from overruling Judge Russon's decision.
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It is the position of Defendant Larsen that the Honorable
Michael R. Murphy simply did not have the authority to overrule
the order granting a new trial issued by his co-equal, the
Honorable Leonard H. Russon.

Furthermore, it is Defendant's

position that Judge Russon was very clear and stated he was
making a "finding" and "ruling," and was not simply having a
discussion on the record with counsel. Therefore, it was prejudicial error for Judge Murphy to have overruled Judge Russon; and
Judge Murphy's order denying Defendant Larsen a new trial should
be reversed, and a new trial granted.
POINT

II

CERTAIN INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY WERE ERRONEOUS AND
CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059
(Utah 1991) , held that, "[A]n accurate instruction upon the basic
elements of an offense is essential.

Failure to so instruct

constitutes reversible error as a matter of law."

823 P.2d at

1061 (citing State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235 (Utah 1985).
A.

Instruction No. 22 was erroneous.

It is Defendant's position that the Court erred in giving
Instruction No. 22 which states as follows:
In order to convict the Defendant of the
charged offense, you must find that he exercised unauthorized control over the property of
another while acting with a specific intent or
purpose to deprive the other person of his/her
property, as defined in these instructions. It
is not necessary that you find that the Defendant formed such specific intent or purpose to
deprive at the time he first obtained control
over the property of another, but such a purpose to deprive may be found at any period of
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time in which the Defendant exercised unauthorized control over such property. (Emphasis
added).
R. 1862.
Since Instruction No. 22 states that intent could be found
at any timef Defendant maintains the jury was erroneously instructed.
The intention to steal must have existed at the time of the
taking and no subsequent felonious intent suffices to carry the
State's burden of proving theft, in the opinion of the Defendant.
See State v. Shonka, 279 P.2d 711, 713 (Utah 1955) (citing People
v. Miller, 11 P. 514 (Utah 1886); State v. Allen, 189 P. 84 (Utah
1920).

See also. State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568 (Utah 1985).

Therefore, Instruction No. 22 is an erroneous statement of
the law and the giving of that instruction constitutes reversible
error as it relates to the issue of the Defendant's intent.
It should be reiterated here that the Honorable Leonard H.
Russon, in reviewing Defendant's prior Motion in Arrest of
Judgment or in the Alternative Motion for New Trial, noted that
had he not granted the Motion in Arrest of Judgment, he would
have granted a new trial in that he believed that the jury was
not properly instructed as to the intent element of the offense
before the Court in this case (See Point I, infra).

Judge Russon

stated, "[b]ut in addition to that, I do make the following
finding that in addition to that, if my ruling had been otherwise, I would have granted a new trial because I don't think the
instruction clearly outlined that intent as is necessary in the
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element instructions.

I think you can do something with a

purpose but I am not sure that that constitutes intent as required by the statute and defined earlier in the statute of a
specific intent to deprive . . . ." (R. 1619, p. 110; Add 1).
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (1980) held
that failure to include the element of intent in the element
instruction in a theft by deception case constituted reversible
error, and this may have been the basis for Judge Russon's ruling
granting the Defendant a new trial,
B.

The State failed to prove Defendant Larsen exercised
unauthorized control over the property of the four
individuals named in Instruction No. 23

It is the position of Defendant Larsen that there was
insufficient evidence to show that he exercised unauthorized
control over the property of the four individuals named in the
Information and Jury Instruction No. 23 (the elements instruction, R. 1863).

Instruction No. 23 provided:

Before you can convict the defendant of the
crime of THEFT, as alleged in the Information, you must find from the evidence, beyond
a reasonable doubt, all of the following
elements of that crime: (1) That the defendant exercised unauthorized control; (2) over
the property of John Chamberlain, Ned
Greqerson, Robert Nelson or Neal Mortensen;
(3) with a purpose to deprive them thereof;
(4) on or about October 10, 1986; (5) in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah; (6) and, that the
value of said property exceeded $1,000.00.
If you believe that the evidence establishes
each and all of the foregoing elements beyond
a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find
the defendant guilty of THEFT.
On the other hand, if the evidence has failed
to establish one or more of the foregoing
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elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is
your duty to find the defendant not guilty of
THEFT.
(Emphasis added).
Limited partnership law is very clear that at the time the
theft in the instant case is alleged to have occurred, none of
the four individuals named in Instruction No. 23 (i.e., John
Chamberlain,

Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson or Neal Mortensen)

owned any of the partnership property.

In fact, U.C.A. § 48-2a-

606 of Utah's Limited Partnership Act provides:
At the time a partner becomes entitled to
receive a distribution, he has the status of,
and is entitled to all remedies available to,
a creditor of the limited partnership with
respect to the distribution.
While this specific statute did not become effective until
1990, Defendant maintains that the entire scheme of the Limited
Partnership Act prior to (as well as after) its amendment has
been to provide that a limited partner, at the time he becomes
entitled to receive a distribution, has all the remedies available to a creditor of the limited partnership with respect to the
distribution.

The specific enactment of U.C.A. § 48-2a-606

effective in 1990 merely codified and clarified that philosophy,
which has permeated the entire Utah Limited Partnership Act from
its inception; and is patterned after the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
In addition, U.C.A. § 48-2-22, in effect at the time of the
alleged theft in this case, provided that a creditor of a limited
partner may charge only the interest of the indebted limited
partner with payment of any unsatisfied claim.
21

The statute

specifically statesf "The interest may be redeemed with the
separate property of any General Partner, but may not be redeemed
with partnership property."

This statute establishes clearly

that a limited partner has no right to, nor interest in, specific
partnership property until an actual distribution occurs.
One of the grounds for the Motion to Dismiss made by the
Defendant at the end of the State's case, and later the Motion
for Directed Verdict made by the Defendant at the end of all the
evidence and prior to submission to the jury, was that the State
had failed to present prima facie evidence, or any kind of
evidence, that the Defendant "[o]btain(ed) or exercise(d) unauthorized control over the property of John Chamberlain, Ned
Gregerson, Robert Nelson, Neal Mortensen, and others with a
purpose to deprive them thereof . . ." as alleged in the Amended
Information.
Furthermore, Defendant requested certain jury instructions
at trial as set forth in Point III infra which were denied but
which would have clarified the status of partnership property and
the limited partner's relationship to the partnership property.
These instructions were essential statements of the law and would
have demonstrated that the evidence was insufficient to support a
verdict of guilty.
It is very clear that if the alleged limited partner victims
in the instant case had a grievance with the manner in which the
Defendant handled the funds from the sale of the Mobile Home Park
in Las Vegas, they had the same right that any creditor of the
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limited partnership would have under Utah law to bring a civil
action against the General Partner.
In Wall Inv. Co. v. Garden Gate Distributing, 593 P.2d 542
(Utah 1979) the Utah Supreme Court held:

"Limited partnerships

were unknown to the common law and are, like corporations, creatures of statute . . . Moreover there is a specific legislative
recognition

that a limited partnership as an entity distinct

from its partners, can bring suit."

593 P.2d at 544.

Partnership law uniformly holds that limited partners do not
have any ownership interest in assets or property of the partnership.

Maxco, Inc. v. Volpe, 274 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. 1981);

Wroblewski v. Brucker, 550 F.Supp. 742 (W.D.Okla. 1982); Bossier
v. Lovell, 410 So.2d 821 (La. 1982); Central Allied Profit
Sharing Trust v. Bailey, 759 P.2d 849 (Colo. 1988); Cramer v.
McDonald, 396 N.E.2d 504 (111. 1979). The Utah Limited Partnership Act is to be construed to effectuate its general purpose and
make Utah's law uniform with other states. U.C.A. § 48-2a-1001.
The Amended Information filed in this case alleged that the
Defendant "[o]btain(ed) or exercise(d) unauthorized control over
the property of John Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson,
Neal Mortensen, and others with a purpose to deprive them thereof. . . ."

(R. 1729).

However, the property that they were

allegedly deprived of, a portion of the $838,000.00 proceeds from
the sale of the Mobile Home Park, was property of the partnership
itself, and not the property of the individual partners. Therefore, the State's evidence at trial failed to prove the allega23

tion in the Amended Information, i.e., that the property of
individuals was "stolen" from those individuals.
This argument becomes particularly significant when it is
noted that in Paragraph 2.2 of the Certificate and Agreement of
Limited Partnership for Three Crowns, Ltd., the partnership was
given the authority to "engage in or possess any interest in
other ventures which may or may not have similar business purposes as those set forth. . .". (R. 1689, Exhibit A attached
thereto p. 2 ) . Further, Paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2 clearly indicated
that distribution of any partnership assets or proceeds was
"subject to maintaining the partnership in a sound financial and
cash position. . ." and "such distributions of cash or other
property would be made to the limited partners only when the
General Partner, in his absolute discretion, determines such is
not needed in the operation (of the partnership), but any distribution will be made only if, in the absolute judgment and discretion of the General Partner. it will not in any way jeopardize or
limit the business of the partnership."

(Emphasis added) (R.

1689, Exhibit A p. 2 ) .
Furthermore, the Partnership Agreement provides in Section
15.1 that "the General Partner shall be solely responsible for
the management of the partnership business with all rights and
powers generally conferred by law or necessary, advisable or
consistent in connection therewith." (R. 1689, Exhibit A p. 6).
In addition to the foregoing, the Partnership Agreement in
Section 15.2, Subsection P provides that among the rights and
24

powers to be held exclusively by the General Partner would be the
power to "sell all or substantially all of the assets of the
limited partnership without the consent of the limited partners."
(R. 1689, Exhibit A p. 8). The General Partner, upon termination
and dissolution of the partnership, is given the power under
Paragraph 21.1, Subsection C to terminate and dissolve the
partnership upon "(S)ale of all properties acquired by the
partnership if the General Partner in its sole discretion determines there is not a compelling reason to continue the partnership."

(R. 1689, Exhibit A p. 13). Also, Section 23.1 provides

for a power of attorney granted by the limited partner to the
General Partner concurrently with the execution of the Partnership Agreement to "take any further action which said attorney
shall consider necessary or convenient in connection with any of
the foregoing hereby giving said attorney full power and authority to do and perform each and every act and thing whatsoever
requisite and necessary to be done in and about the foregoing as
fully as said limited partner might or could do if personally
present, and hereby ratifying and confirming all that said
attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof."
(R. 1689, Exhibit A p. 14).
The Defendant introduced at trial the Subscription Agreement
of each of the named individuals in the Amended Information, and
each of them did in fact provide through those Subscription
Agreements the power of attorney referred to in Section 23.3 of
the Partnership Agreement (R. 1689, Exhibit A p. 15).
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It should therefore be readily seen by the Court, that
pursuant to Utah law, a limited partner simply stands in the
shoes of a normal creditor with regard to any distributions he
feels he is entitled to receive at any time.

Given the discre-

tionary powers granted to the General Partner as outlined above,
and the fact that no limited partner had an ownership interest in
the proceeds of the sale of the Mobile Home Park in Las Vegas,
the State utterly and completely failed to prove that Defendant
Larsen obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the
property of John Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson, Neal
Mortensen, and others with a purpose to deprive them thereof.
POINT

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GIVE SPECIFIC
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT.
A.

Instructions Re: Limited Partnerships.

It is the position of Defendant Larsen that his right to due
process of law and a fair trial in the instant matter was denied
under both the Utah and United States Constitutions when the
Court failed to give the jury certain specific instructions.

The

Defendant requested jury instructions at trial as follows:
1.

"At the time a limited partner becomes entitled to

receive a distribution from the limited partnership, he has the
status of, and is entitled to all remedies available to, a
creditor of the limited partnership with respect to the distribution."
2.

"Where two persons create a relationship of debtor and

creditor, a failure of one of the parties to pay over money in
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satisfaction of the debt does not constitute the crime of theft."
3.

"A limited partner has no interest in the specific

assets of the partnership by virtue of his status as a limited
partner; rather he simply owns a percentage interest in the legal
entity which is the limited partnership." (R. 1860).
Even though the Defendant submitted these three instructions
as "Defendant's Proposed Additional Jury Instructions" on December 11, 1990, they were, for unknown reasons, excluded from the
record of this case (See Affidavit of Larry R. Keller, Add. 3).
The Court refused to give the first two but did give the
third to the jury, and the Defendant took appropriate exception
thereto.

The Court's failure to give these instructions denied

the Defendant his theory of the defense and constituted reversible error per se.
As authority for the proposition that these instructions
should have been provided to the jury, the Defendant cited U.C.A.
§ 48-2a-606 quoted verbatim for the first instruction mentioned
above.

Defendant cited the case of State v. Siers, 248 N.W.2d 1

(Neb. 1976) as authority for allowing the Defendant's second
requested instruction.

As to the third requested instruction,

the Defendant cited State v. Birch, 675 P.2d 246 (C.A. Wash.
1984) and Evans v. Galardi, 546 P.2d 313 (Cal.S.Ct. 1976).

The

Defendant further cited U.C.A. §§ 48-2-22, 48-2-23, 48-2a-606,
and 48-2a-703 as examples of Utah's partnership law which stood
for the proposition outlined in Defendant's proposed third
instruction mentioned above.
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The failure of the Court to give all three of these jury
instructions which accurately reflect Utah law regarding limited
partnerships, meant that the jury had an incomplete understanding
of what would have been necessary for the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt in order for the Jury to find the Defendant
guilty.

The Defendant therefore was denied his right to a fair

trial and he should be granted a new trial with the aforementioned instructions proposed by the Defendant given to the jury
at that new trial.
B.

Instruction Re; Time of Forming Intent.

Defendant Larsen requested that the Court provide the
following instruction to the jury:
In order to convict the Defendant of the
crime of Theft, it is necessary for you to
find that the intent to steal existed at the
time of the taking of the property, and no
subsequent felonious intent will suffice.
Therefore, if you find that at the time the
Defendant C. Dean Larsen is alleged to have
obtained or exercised unauthorized control
over the property of John Chamberlain, Ned
Gregerson, Robert Nelson and Neal Mortensen,
he did not have the intent to steal their
property, no subsequent felonious intent will
suffice and you must conclude that the State
has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the element of intent to commit the crime of
Theft.
R. 1838.
The Court refused to give this instruction, and the Defendant took an exception.
The intent to steal in a theft case must have existed at the
time of the taking and no subsequent felonious intent suffices to
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carry the State's burden of proving Theft.

People v. Miller, 4

Utah 410, 11 P. 514 (1886); State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P. 84
(1920); see State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568 (Utah 1985).
Defendant Larsen maintains that the failure of the Court to
give this specific instruction meant that the jury did not have
full information regarding the elements of the crime in this
particular case.

In State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991),

the Utah Supreme Court held:
. . . The jury must be instructed with respect to all the legal elements that it must
find to convict of the crime charged, and the
absence of such an instruction is reversible
error as a matter of law. State v. Lane, 618
P.2d at 35. In State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d
235 (Utah 1985), we stated, "The general rule
is that an accurate instruction upon the
basic elements of an offense is essential.
Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible
error." Id. at 239 (Utah 1985) (citing Lane,
618 P.2d at 35). See also State v. Harmon,
712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986) per curiam;
State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1252 (Utah
1984). Thus, the failure to give this instruction can never be harmless error.
823 P.2d at 1061.
It is the position of Defendant Larsen that the Court's
failure to accurately inform the jury that the intent to steal
must have existed at the time of the taking of the property, and
no subsequent felonious intent would suffice, means that the jury
was not properly instructed as to the elements of this offense,
and a reversible error of law occurred.

The Court should grant a

new trial in this case for this reason alone.
C.

Good Faith Instruction.

The Defendant proposed the following instruction:
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Good faith, as commonly used, means a
belief or state of mind denoting honesty of
purpose or freedom from intention to commit
theft.
If the evidence in this case leaves you
with a reasonable doubt whether the Defendant
obtained or exercised control over the property of another in good faith, then you
should find the Defendant not guilty of
Theft.
R. 1842.
The Court's failure to give this instruction denied the
Defendant his right to due process of law under both the Utah and
the United States Constitutions.
If there is sufficient evidence to support a proposed jury
instruction on any issue, the trial court has a duty to adequately instruct the jury if defendants so request.
706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985).

State v. Smith,

The trial was replete with informa-

tion from numerous witnesses, including Defendant Larsen himself
that the actions taken by the Defendant in dealing with the
proceeds of the sale of the Three Crowns Mobile Home Park in Las
Vegas, Nevada, were all undertaken in "good faith."

The Defen-

dant testified that he believed at all times that he had the
authority to deal with the proceeds in the manner in which he did
and that he at all times acted in good faith.

Because the

evidence was clear on this point, the Court should have given the
good faith instruction requested by the Defendant, and its
failure to do so constitutes an error of law which should result
in a new trial.
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POINT

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO IMPEACH
THE DEFENDANT THROUGH THE USE OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS
ENTERED ON 18 COUNTS OF SECURITIES FRAUD.
A.

Under the circumstances of this case, the Court did
have discretion to exclude the Defendant's prior convictions*

Prior to the trial of this matter, the Defendant made a
Motion to Exclude Evidence of Prior Convictions dated November
21, 1990 (R. 1650, 1651).

Defendant Larsen had been convicted of

18 counts of Securities Fraud on August 6, 1990. The trial in
the instant case began on December 4, 1990. The Honorable
Leonard H. Russon denied Defendant's motion and ruled that the
State could ask the Defendant about his prior felony convictions
if he testified in the trial, and he would be required to answer
truthfully.

Judge Russon also ruled that Defendant would be

allowed to make the statement that his convictions were on appeal
(R. 2056 p. 92).
As a matter of strategy, Defendant Larsen and his attorney
recorded on the record their position that Defendant Larsen's
attorney would ask Defendant Larsen about his convictions when he
took the stand to testify in the case on direct examination.
Defendant Larsen thus preserved his record with regard to the
Motion to Exclude Evidence of Prior Convictions, since it was
stated clearly for the record that defense counsel would not have
asked Mr. Larsen about his convictions had the Court not denied
his Motion to exclude the convictions. The State clarified on
the record that it did intend to ask Mr. Larsen about his convictions, and defense counsel further clarified the fact that the
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testimony of the Defendant was essential to his defense in the
case (R. 2056 p. 92).
The Defendant was originally bound over by the Third Circuit
Court on a single Information alleging 42 counts.

The Defendant,

on April 24, 1990, filed with this Court a Motion to Sever the 42
counts of the Information into five separate trials.

On May 8,

1990, the Honorable Judge Russon granted the Defendant's Motion
to Sever, "[f]or the reasons set forth in Defendant's Memorandum
of Points and Authorities and oral argument. . .".
Despite the State's efforts to rejoin the remaining counts
once the first trial involving 18 counts of Securities Fraud had
occurred, Judge Russon once again ruled that the counts would
remain severed as he initially had ordered on May 8, 1990.
What the Defendant did in making the Motion to Sever and
resisting the State's subsequent motion to rejoin the counts, was
to exercise his constitutional right under both the Utah and the
United States Constitutions to due process of law.

Specifically,

the Defendant argued that he could not have a fair trial if all
these counts had been joined together.

Among the reasons argued

by the Defendant (which the Court adopted as a basis for granting
the Motion to Sever) was that the joining of all these unrelated
charges into a single Information was an attempt on the part of
the State to show the "bad character" of the Defendant.

Defen-

dant argued that such efforts would violate Rule 404 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.
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When Judge Russon found in favor of the State by not excluding the prior convictions, the Court penalized the Defendant for
having exercised his constitutional right to due process of law
and a fair trial by requesting the severance of the counts
originally contained in the Information.
The State should not have been able to have it both ways,
particularly in this case which required such a strained application of the theft statute to an otherwise established business
procedure.

If the State would have had its way originally, there

would have only been a single trial with 42 counts involved.
Therefore, there would be no prior conviction situation such as
exists presently for the Defendant to confront.

However, having

lost its efforts to combine all of those charges into a single
trial, the State then argued that the trial court had absolutely
no discretion about allowing the use of the 18 convictions
obtained in the first trial to be used to impeach the Defendant
on cross-examination in the upcoming trial.
It is to be reiterated that the Theft trial came pursuant to
the exact same case number as the 18 convictions for Securities
Fraud.

Essentially the two trials (as well as the remaining

three) were all part of the same case.

Therefore, Defendant

adamantly maintains that the trial court clearly had the discretion to exclude the prior Securities Fraud convictions because
they were all part of the same case which was tried before the
jury on December 4, 1990. Had the prior convictions in question
occurred under some previous case number at some earlier time,
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then the issue could be different.

However, the fact that this

second trial occurred pursuant to the same case number and is all
part of the same case as the first trial should have prevented
the Court from thinking that its discretion was so limited.
B.

The Court should have excluded the Defendant's prior
convictions under the circumstances of this case because the prior convictions are presently on appeal.

The Defendant appealed his judgment and sentence issued by
the Court on August 6, 1990 to the Utah Court of Appeals, and
said convictions were affirmed.

However, the Utah Supreme Court

has granted certiorari on the Securities Fraud convictions, and
all parties are awaiting a final decision by the Utah Supreme
Court on the allegations of lack of a fair trial argued by the
Defendant with regard to those convictions (oral argument is
scheduled September 9, 1993).

Defendant argued to the lower

court that it would have been judicially uneconomical, as well as
a violation of his rights under the Utah and United States
Constitutions if the Court were to allow the jury in the Theft
trial to learn of the evidence of the Defendant's prior convictions, and then those prior convictions were later reversed on
appeal.
Under such circumstances, the fact that the Court allowed
the Defendant to be impeached by the State's presentation of
evidence relating to his prior Securities Fraud convictions would
necessitate a reversal of the conviction in the Theft case.

It

cannot possibly be considered fair and just for the Defendant to
have been impeached by 18 prior felony convictions which are
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later reversed on appeal. This fact alone would constitute
reversible prejudicial error.
While the Defendant does admit that Rule 609(e) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence provides that the pendency of an appeal does
not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible, Defendant
submits that under the circumstances of this individual case,
which had been bifurcated into five trials under the same case
number, the pendency of an appeal should render the evidence of
the convictions inadmissible.

Rule 609(e) was not intended to

apply to such a situation.
C.

Defendant's prior convictions for Securities Fraud do
not necessarily involve dishonesty or false statement.

The Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12
(Utah App. 1988), found that all crimes do not necessarily
involve dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2) of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.

In Wight, the Defendant had a prior

conviction for aggravated robbery and the Utah Court of Appeals
found that, "The crime of robbery is not necessarily one of
dishonesty or false statement" and the evidence of the prior
robbery conviction is not automatically admissible under
609(a)(2).
In the subsequent case of State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093
(Utah App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the trial
court should make some inquiry into the facts of the prior crimes
to determine if dishonesty or false statement was involved, and
that the crime of Theft does not necessarily involve dishonesty
or false statement.
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The Information alleging the 18 counts of Securities Fraud
in the first trial in this case claimed that Defendant Larsen
"[w]illfully made an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading."

(Emphasis added).

Since the

jury in that case was given two options on each count to find the
Defendant guilty, it is possible that the jury did not find there
were untrue statements of material facts, but rather felt that
the Defendant had omitted informing the individuals named about
material facts. The Court also declined to give a specific
intent instruction in that case as requested by the Defendant.
Therefore, as in the Wight case and the Brown case where the Utah
Court of Appeals found that the crimes of aggravated robbery and
theft were not necessarily crimes of dishonesty or false statement, the crimes for which Defendant Larsen was convicted also
did not necessarily involve dishonesty or false statement.
Defendant Larsen submits that the Court is not bound by the
mandatory requirements of U.R.E. Rule 609(a)(2) as alleged by the
State, even if the Court rejected the arguments made in the first
two sections of this point.
If the inquiry goes to U.R.E. Rule 609(a)(1), as provided in
the Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Banner. Ill

P.2d 1325

(Utah 1986), the Court must become involved in balancing the
probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect to
the Defendant.

In making such a balancing test, the Court is
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required to consider the following:

(1) the nature of the

crime, as bearing on the character for veracity of the witness;
(2) the recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction. . .;
(3) the similarity of the prior crime to the charged crime,
insofar as a close resemblance may lead the jury to punish the
accused as a bad person; (4) the importance of credibility issues
in determining the truth in a prosection tried without decisive
non-testimonial evidence
. . .; and (5) the importance of the accused's testimony, as
perhaps warranting exclusion of convictions.
Under the Banner test, the Court can see that it may have
been determined that the nature of the 18 counts of Securities
Fraud were such that they didn't necessarily have a bearing on
the veracity of the Defendant; and even though the convictions
were recent, the similarity of the prior crimes to the charged
crime of Theft may lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad
person, rather than decide the case on the evidence presented.
Furthermore, there was no decisive, non-testimonial evidence with
regard to the crime of Theft in the trial held on December 4,
1990.

Rather, the State relied on a convoluted series of trans-

actions in an effort to convince the jury that the Defendant
exercised unauthorized control over the property of the named
alleged victims with a purpose to deprive them of that property.
Looking at the last point of the balancing test, the
accused's testimony was extremely important in light of the fact
that the evidence was all circumstantial and was primarily the
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result of a convoluted tracing of transactions by the State's
witnesses.

The intent with which the Defendant acted was essen-

tial to the case.
If all of these items are balanced, and the Court takes into
consideration that the theft trial was only one more trial under
the same case number with an Information which originally alleged
42 counts by the State's choice, the Court can readily see that
the probative value of the admissibility of these convictions far
outweighed the prejudicial effect, in that the Defendant's right
to a fair trial was denied.
Because we are still dealing with the same case, Defendant
believes that the Court should have been compelled to the conclusion that the prior 18 Securities Fraud convictions should not
have been admitted, and the mandatory provisions of U.R.E. Rule
609(a)(2) did not apply under these circumstances. However, even
if the Court determined that the mandatory provisions were
applicable in this situation, the crimes with which the Defendant
was previously convicted, Securities Fraud, do not automatically
involve dishonesty or false statement and the Court should be
allowed to proceed to the balancing test allowed under U.R.E.
Rule 609(a)(1) and the reasoning of the Court in Banner.

Under

such a balancing test, the Court must conclude that the prior
convictions should have been excluded.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Banner, supra, stated
that "Utah's Rule 609 is the Federal rule verbatim," and advised
that "Federal case law should be consulted for advice interpret38

ing the rule."

Because subsection (2) of Rule 609 is purely

mechanical in its operation, the range of offenses encompassed by
the phrase "dishonesty or false statement" is a crucial issue.
Federal rule 609 is a hybrid product of various legislative
approaches resulting from the confusion of prior law.

Although

some form of dishonesty or false statement may be thought to
adhere in nearly all crimes, the legislative history indicates
that a narrow construction of the phrase was understood by those
who voted this rule into law.
n.104.

See 31 Rutgers L.Rev. 908, 923

Further, the nature of automatic admission of prior

convictions itself, which recognizes no special or extenuating
circumstances such as we find in subsection (1) of the rule,
speaks to the need for a narrow construction of the term "dishonesty or false statement."

U.S. v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2nd

Cir. 1977), cert denied 434 U.S. 867 (1977).
Congress did not provide final guidance as to which crimes
involve "dishonesty or false statement."

Rule 609(a)(2) is an

anachronism in the Federal (and therefore State) Rules of Evidence.

With few exceptions evidence is admitted pursuant to

rules 401, 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence focusing on
legal relevancy under the control of the trial court's discretion.

In Rule 609(a)(2) by legislative fiat, the relevancy

determination by the trial court is decided and the trial court
apparently has no discretion in the matter.
Due to the unfair aspects of this mechanical operation of
the rule, several courts have attempted to solve the problem by
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narrowly interpreting the words of the statute under Rule
609(a)(2).

In U.S. v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121, the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that the crime
defined by Rule 609, subsection (2) must contain "an intent to
deceive or defraud."

Thus, by limiting the crimes included under

the dishonesty section (subsection (2)), most prior crime decisions will be decided under Rule 609(a)(1) in accordance with the
general intent of Congress and the method advocated by the body
of the Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the standard which requires
a crime to include an element of intent to deceive or defraud
would possess the advantage of ease of application.

Courts are

more familiar with crimes of this nature and the conference
report's initial list serves as a reference. At the same time
such a test will force a court to look beyond the label of the
offense to an investigation of whether it involved an intent to
deceive.

Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 281 (3rd Cir.

1976); see also, 71 NW.U.L.Rev. 655, 657:
esty

and False

Statement

Rule

609(a)(2)

Dishon-

(1976).

The Federal Court of Appeals in Millings recognized that the
disparate legislative histories of the two provisions of Rule 609
require a much narrower construction of the language contained in
subsection (2). Thus it held that the possession of heroin and
the possession of an unlicensed pistol did not fall within the
ambit of subsection (2) because neither offense involved an
intent to deceive or fraud.

Further, the Court decided that

since this in effect was a "close case" and involved a "test of
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credibility", the improper admission of prior convictions could
not be merely harmless error*

535 F.2d at 123-124.

The most salient contribution of Millings is its recognition
that dishonesty or false statement defines a narrow sub-set of
crimes directly related to testimonial veracity.
L.Rev. 908, 928 n.130.

31 Rutgers

See also. State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d

217, 222 n.2 (Utah App. 1988).
If such a careful and narrow construction is not applied to
Rule 609(a)(2), offenses properly admitted only through discretionary balancing of subsection (1) would be admitted automatically under subsection (2), contrary to the original Congressional intent at the time Rule 609 was promulgated by Congress.
Otherwise defendants would be denied the protection inherent in
any judicial balancing process, as well as specific protection,
namely the presumption of inadmissibility and the resulting
proponent's burden of rebuttal, which is deliberately built into
Rule 609(a)(1).

The prosecution on the other hand, would reap

the advantage of automatic admission without having the obstacles
of Rule 609(a)(1).

By stripping away the shield of rule

609(a)(1), the trial court's decision in the instant case defeats
the legislative intent to protect defendants from the impact of
unfair prejudice and the general principle of encouraging defendants to testify when they so choose.

The lower court's decision

in the instant case also frustrates the legislative intent to
accommodate the divergent attitudes of the U.S. House and Senate
with an intricate compromise allowing automatic admission of the
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narrow range of offenses under 609(a)(2) while providing a strong
built-in protection of defendants under Rule 609(a)(1).
These considerations are particularly valid in the instant
case.

Defendant's convictions of Securities Fraud under Utah law

were not convictions of crimes involving intentional dishonesty
or false statement.

Defendant's convictions were actually a form

of "strict liability."

One of the primary issues currently on

appeal before the Utah Supreme Court on the Securities Fraud
convictions is the issue of the Defendant's intent. At the
Securities Fraud trial, Defendant Larsen vigorously argued that
an element of a securities law violation included the element of
intent.

The State argued that intent was not an element of

securities fraud violations and the trial judge so ruled.

The

Defendant was thus denied a jury instruction on the element of
intent.

As a result, the jury did not consider the element of

intentional dishonesty or false statement in its deliberations
and ultimate finding that the Defendant was guilty of the crimes
of Securities Fraud.
Defendant Larsen argues that this is exactly the type of
situation Congress intended should be balanced under the specific
protection of Rule 609(a)(1) rather than being automatically
admitted under Rule 609(a)(2).
1049, 1057 (1983).

See U.S. v. Lipscombe, 702 F.2d

Surely the exclusion of evidence of prior

convictions will generally result in less confusion of the issues
and fairer trials for defendants.
Recent Developments at 189.
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See 1987 Utah Law Review;

Where the State has a strong case, the automatic admission
of prior convictions under Rule 609(a)(2) might presumably have
less impact on a jury's deliberations.

However, in the instant

case where the State's position is so uncertain, the trial
court's erroneous ruling under Rule 609(a)(2) cannot fairly be
said not to have influenced the judgment of the jury and therefore, the error in this case was not harmless.

See Kotteakos v.

United States. 328 U.S., 750, 765 (1946); Virgin Islands v. Toto,
529 F.2d 278, 283.

In the instant case, evidence of the

Defendant's prior convictions of 18 counts of Securities fraud
may very well have tipped the scales against him.

See U.S. v.

Slade, 627 F.2d 293, 308 (1980).
POINT

V

THE COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING STATE'S WITNESS JOHN BALDWIN
TO TESTIFY CONCERNING AN INVESTIGATION OF GRANADA, INC.
FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES VIOLATIONS.
At the trial of the instant matter, the State was allowed to
call witness John Cheney Baldwin.

Mr. Baldwin testified that

five years previous to his current employment he had been the
director of the Utah Securities Division.

He testified that

three years prior to that he was an assistant Utah Attorney
General and had been in private practice earlier.

Over defense

counsel's objection, Mr. Baldwin was asked if he was aware of an
investigation of Granada Inc. by the Utah Securities Division
subsequent to 1985.
The trial judge overruled defense counsel's objection and
Mr. Baldwin was specifically asked the following:
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Q: (By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Baldwin, do you
recall that one of the issues that you were
looking at or the division was looking at was
the sale of unregistered securities?
A:

Yes, that is correct.

Q: Do you recall how that was related to
Granada? Can you explain that a little?
A: Well, there was, to my recollection,
several entities which I would recall are
satellites around Granada. That Granada was
an operation in which money was going. There
were other entities in which money was coming
and going, and that collectively we will
refer to that group as Granada because that
essentially was the mother ship. We were
again concerned that certain of these sales
of promissory notes, securities, other types
of instruments constituted unregistered securities which have not been registered and
that was the basis of the discussions that we
had with Granada.
Q: Can you recall the magnitude of the
amount of money that was invested in these
unregistered securities?
Mr. Keller:

Objection. . .

(Overruled)

A: It was millions of dollars. My recollection is, as well as that, in order to reconcile the negotiations and to provide an offering statement to our satisfaction to keep
the operation ongoing, that collectively was
fifteen million dollars.
R. 2057 pp. Ill, 112.
As if these discussions regarding unregistered securities
violations were not enough, the prosecutor took the opportunity
to ask Mr. Baldwin about other matters under investigation by the
Utah Securities Division which did not relate to the Three Crowns
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Limited Partnership or the theft alleged in the instant case (R.
2057 pp. Ill, 112).
Defendant submits that the Court's decision to overrule his
counsel's objections to the aforementioned questions regarding an
investigation of Granada, Inc. not related to the Three Crowns
Limited partnership constituted clear and prejudicial error.
There can be no doubt that the purpose for the introduction of
such evidence was to attempt to assassinate the Defendant's
character.

Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that

"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith . . . ." Although there are exceptions to
this general rule, Defendant submits that the alleged evidence of
the Utah Securities Division's investigation was introduced for
the sole purpose of attempting to prove that Defendant had been
engaged in other bad acts during the period of time that the
Three Crowns Limited matters were active.

In such a unique and

uncertain case as the instant matter, those "charged" statements
from such an authoritative figure may have been devastating to
the Defendant in the jury's deliberations.
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows the court to
exclude even evidence found relevant, on the grounds that its
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury
... ."

Since the investigation of Granada Inc. as a whole did

not involve an investigation of the Three Crowns Limited Part45

nershipf the prejudice created in the jury's mind by allowing the
witness to discuss an official investigation of other entities
involved with Defendant Larsen created unfair prejudice and was a
violation of the Defendant's right to due process of law under
both the Utah and the United States Constitutions.
Defendant maintains that the trial court's admission of the
foregoing evidence over his objection constituted prejudicial
error under Rules 403 and 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Defendant was significantly and unfairly prejudiced by the
admission of this evidence and believes that he should be granted
a new trial on this ground alone.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Larsen believes that any one of the issues he has
raised constitutes unfair prejudicial error which prevented him
from having a fair trial, in violation of his rights under both
the Utah and United States Constitutions.

However, when each of

these issues is considered in the context of the others, it is
very clear that overall, Defendant Larsen was denied a fair
trial.
It is respectfully requested that this Court reverse his
conviction for theft and order a* new trial in this matter.
DATED this

W ^ d a y of ^ * 3 e ^ A . , 1993.

Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies
of the Appellant's Brief to be hand delivered, this
September 1993, to:
CHRISTINE
Assistant
236 State
Salt Lake

F. SOLTIS
Attorney General
Capitol
City, Utah 84114
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ADDENDUM

1

1

I constitute theft in this particular case.

2

grant the Motion in Arrest of Judgment.

3

I

So I therefore

The State has a right to appeal this by statute

4

and I fully expect they will appeal it.

But in addition

5

to that, I do make the following finding that in addition

6

to that, if my ruling had been otherwise, I would have

7

granted a new trial because I don't think the instruction

8

clearly outlined that intent as is necessary in the

9

element instructions.

1 think you can do something with

10

a purpose but I am not sure that that constitutes intent

11

as required by the statute and defined earlier in the

12

statute of a specific intent to deprive.

13

wrong in that, but that would be the second prong and I

14

only mention that because if this does go on appeal, Mr.

15

Parrish, you should be able to appeal that as well.

16

MR. PARRISH:

17

THE COURT:

And I may be

Thank you, Your Honor.
So that if it is reversed, when it

18

comes back that will catch everyone's eye so that same

19

instruction won't be used over again.

20

it again, and then you end up going back to the Court of

21

Appeals again.

22

I everyone's time.

23

I that regard.

24

I

25

And then you try

That is a waste of resources and
So that is the reason I am ruling in

Okay, anything further?

MR. KELLER:

Your Honor, there is one

additional procedural element under Rule 23. Will the
110

ADDENDUM

2

LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendant
257ower,
Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO REDUCE JUDGE
LEONARD H. RUSSON'S ORDER
GRANTING A NEW TRIAL TO
WRITING

Plaintiff,
v.
C. DEAN LARSEN,

Case No. 891900927FS
Defendant.
ooOoo
COMES NOW Defendant C. Dean Larsen, by and through his
attorney, Larry R. Keller, Esq., and moves this Court for an
Order reducing to writing Judge Russon's oral finding and order
of February 19, 1991, in the above-entitled Theft matter.

Said

order granted a new trial on the Theft charge involving the Three
Crowns partnership.
DATED this j ^ ^ d a y of £><^Tftffa&. , 1992.

jELLER,
.or Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to be hand delivered this 2C>ik
1992, to:
Michael D. Wims
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

2

day of October

ADDENDUM

3

LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
KELLER & LUNDGREN, L.C.
Attorney for Defendant
257 Tower, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff\Appellee,

:

v.

:

C. DEAN LARSEN,

:

Defendant\Appellant.

AFFIDAVIT OF
LARRY R. KELLER

Case No. 930286-CA

:
ooOoo

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss.
)

LARRY R. KELLER, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

I was the defense attorney for C. Dean Larsen and we

tried his case between December 4 and 14, 1990, on the charge of
Theft, which is the subject of the instant appeal.
2.

On or about December 11, 1990, I filed "Defendant's

Proposed Additional Jury Instructions" which are attached hereto
as Exhibit 1 with Judge Russon and the Third District Court.
3.

The proposed jury instructions were in addition to other

1

jury instructions I had previously submitted to the court.
4.

The reader will note that the proposed additional jury

instructions are duplicated, with one copy bearing citations and
the second copy not bearing citations as required by Judge Russon
during that trial.
5.

It is to be noted that Judge Russon gave to the jury the

third proposed additional jury instruction but refused to give
the first two additional instructions.
6.

I specifically recall having delivered a copy of these

proposed instructions to Mark Griffin and Robert Parrish, the
prosecutors in the case, on or about December 11, 1990, and well
in advance of the time the matter was submitted to the jury on
December 14, 1990.
7.

The reader will note that the third proposed additional

jury instruction does not appear anywhere else in Defendant's
proposed jury instructions, and is clear evidence that it was one
of the three that were submitted to the court as stated in this
Affidavit.
8.

I am uncertain as to why these proposed additional jury

instructions were not included in the record certified from the
District Court to the Utah Court of Appeals, but believe it was a
simple error on the court's part.
9.

The discussion surrounding these jury instructions was
2

held in Judge Russon's chambers without the court reporter
present, and this is the reason no reference to these proposed
additional jury instructions appears in the record.
DATED this

7

day of ^ k ^ f c . , 1993.

SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me this
day of
Sep^mW
1993 by Larry R. Keller.
Notary Public
XTEast200South#340

;
i

D^ember21.wSe j
—^IS'^—.J

/<>

,

r

.

NOTARY PUBLIC, / R e s i d i n g a t
S a l t Lake County, Utah

(Stamp)
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
ADDITIONAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS

v.
C. DEAN LARSEN,
Case No. 891900927
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant.

ooOoo
Comes

now

Defendant,

C. Dean

Larsen,

and

proposes

the

following additional requested jury instructions.
DATED this

)1 -" day of December, 1990.

tlAJNEC.
IRY R. KELLER
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendant C. Dean Larsen

EXHIBIT

1

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be hand delivered on this
1990, to:
Mark Griffin
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114

I3j-

2

day of December,

INSTRUCTION NO.
At the time a limited partner becomes entitled to receive a
distribution from a limited partnership, he has the status of, and
is entitled to all remedies available to, a creditor of the limited
partnership with respect to the distribution.

Utah Code Annotated § 48-2a-606

INSTRUCTION NO.

At the time a limited partner becomes entitled to receive a
distribution from a limited partnership, he has the status of, and
is entitled to all remedies available to, a creditor of the limited
partnership with respect to the distribution.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Where

two

persons

create

a relationship

of

debtor and

creditor, a failure of one of the parties to pay over money in
satisfaction of the debt does not constitute the crime of theft.

State v. Siers, 248 N.W.2d 1 (Nebr. 1976)

INSTRUCTION NO.
Where

two

persons

create

a relationship

of debtor and

creditor, a failure of one of the parties to pay over money in
satisfaction of the debt does not constitute the crime of theft.

INSTRUCTION NO.
A limited partner has no interest in the specific assets of
the partnership by virtue of his status as a limited partner;
rather he simply owns a percentage interest in the legal entity
which is the limited partnership.

State v. Birch, 675 P.2d 246
Evans v. Galardi, 546 P.2d 313
U.C.A. § 48-2-22
U.C.A. § 48-2-23
U.C.A. § 48-2a-606
U.C.A. § 48-2a-703

INSTRUCTION NO.
A limited partner has no interest in the specific assets of
the partnership by virtue of his status as a limited partner;
rather he simply owns a percentage interest in the legal entity
which is the limited partnership.

